INTRODUCTION
Legal scholarship on the Olympics has previously tended to focus on outlining the legal landscape that exists around the Olympic Games. 1 international private association. 5 The key distinction in this law making process is that this pressure to enact law is exerted upon individual nation states by the IOC for the benefit of its commercial partners and those of the organising committees of the Olympic Games, 6 whereas international law is usually created as a result of those nation states entering into Treaties with each other, or with transnational organisations, for the benefit of all. 7 This article analyses the phenomenon of Olympic law making, and considers whether the legal framework demanded by the IOC via the Host City Contract conforms to accepted norms of transnational law creation, or whether in fact it provides evidence of a distinctive sub-category. Within this analysis, three specific issues are drawn out. First, that the IOC is a distinctive form of transnational body creating a distinctive type of sports law that is effectively forcibly transplanted from the host jurisdiction of one event to the next, under threat of removal of the hosting rights, thereby producing a self-referential normative framework. Secondly, that these enforced transplants are becoming accepted norms without any real Parliamentary interrogation as a pragmatic response to the IOC's requirement to pass legislation of this kind. 8 Thirdly, these 5 On the legal status of the IOC, see further below, n 17. 6 For example, the only other entity whose symbols are protected specifically by law is the Red Cross (and related organisations) by s 6 Geneva Conventions Act 1957, a protection granted for obvious humanitarian, not commercial, purposes. Olympic laws are regularly used as a template for similar legal protections to be demanded by, or offered to, the organisers of other sporting mega events. 9 Whilst Olympic and sports law focussed, this article raises important broader points, in particular, the need to resist legal expansion without proper accountability and stress testing, and the need to guard against forced, and potentially dangerous, transplants. It examines the concept of legal transplant through the prism of Olympic law and analyses the impact that such transplants have on national law and the law-making process. It concludes by demonstrating that the IOC is able to exploit its unique position in world sport to create transnational legal norms that it then forces nation states to implement by means of the Host City Contract.
THE IOC AS TRANSNATIONAL BODY
Transnational organisations (TNOs) have been defined as 'all enterprises which control assets -factories, mines, sales offices, and the like in two or more countries.' 10 Huntington has provided a more sophisticated definition whereby a Olympic law can, therefore, be distinguished from other commonly acknowledged forms of sports law. Whether in its Anglicised or Latinised form as lex sportiva, the definition of sports law remains highly contested, and indeed its existence as a discrete discipline continues to generate debate. 36 Siekmann has attempted to explore the etymology and scope of the various terminologies, 37
although sports law scholars have often been guilty of using these terms interchangeably. 38 This debate aside, it is now undeniable that there is in place a system of regulatory governance in sport, however it is conceptualised, 39
although it is premature to claim that a fully functioning transnational legal system for sport is yet in existence. 40 Despite this lack of agreement, the analysis of the predominant terms is of special interest to legal theorists who see sport as a regulatory regime juridifying into a form of transnational law outside the 46 Siekmann, above n 43, Beloff, above n 36 and K Foster, 'Lex Sportiva: Transnational law in action' in Siekmann and Soel, above n 37, 235-250. 47 Duval, above n 4, at 836. transnational law, 48 though it is not regulating a specific activity as would an international sports federation, as it is creating transnational legal norms. On the other, the creation of municipal law at the behest of the IOC is something outside of any of the accepted definitions of sports law and sits uneasily alongside accepted definitions of transnational law as it is the forced creation, or even the forced transplantation, of law in the jurisdiction hosting the Olympic Games.
This alternative interpretation appears to be a new category of transnational law; it is national law forced into existence by transnational norms created by a private transnational organisation. Thus, the IOC does not fulfil its tasks in cooperation with states, 49 but by requiring them to act on its behalf. Legislative creep, as we originally defined it, is the incremental, and often unchecked, extension of legislative provisions to contexts and/or jurisdictions beyond the context or jurisdiction for which they were originally intended.
OLYMPIC LAW AND 'FORCED' TRANSPLANTS
Broadly construed, it refers to the process by which legal frameworks will develop and grow reflexively, drawing upon past experience and often responding to close loopholes identified by event 'post-mortems'. It tends to be iterative and has a tendency to increase the breadth of legislative scope by drawing upon past experience whilst also anticipating future developments.
Whilst the concept describes the process that occurs, 54 from a transnational law perspective this process can be viewed as a form of legal transplant.
On one level this creep can essentially be seen as an iterative development of perceived legal 'best practice' from one thematically related event to another.
Crucially, this is effectively a forced legal transplant -something that is required of the host in order to conform with transnational norms, dictated and required by the IOC in this case. The effect is the incremental extension of legislative provisions within the same context, but transplanted to a new jurisdiction outside that for which they were originally intended. The 'creep' identified is twofold: the extension of the legislative protections offered and that these protections are enacted in a new jurisdiction. This is illustrated below in section 5 with a case 54 We previously stratified this again as horizontal and vertical legislative creep, but both are instances of a process that can be seen as legal transplant study detailing the extension and transplantation of laws to combat ambush Whichever approach is preferred, the essential debate is usually whether, in the case of law that is in some way transplanted, this operation is a success or failure. In terms of Olympic law, the process is extraordinarily self-referential and self-fulfilling.
Perhaps uniquely, we are seeing a very specific form of transplant, one that is forced upon the host by a private body, under threat that if there is a failure to comply, the invitation to host the Olympic Games will be withdrawn. Thus, Olympic Law is created as a condition or requirement of the private body. It is also a very one-sided process, led in this case by the IOC itself, that runs the risk of appearing to be an autonomous, closed, self-regulating system operating outside of the review of the courts. 62 Further, there could be instances of disconnection where the specificities of the host are not taken into account, for example, if the IOC's demands conflict with the new host's constitution or human rights obligations; 63 potentially too this disconnection becomes more pronounced as the transplant is de-contextualised across events, as in seen in case study 2.
CASE STUDY (1) AMBUSH MARKETING PROVISIONS AT THE OLYMPIC GAMES
All prospective Host Cities will already have in place some form of intellectual property protection, enacted nationally and in many cases homogenised via 62 Foster, above n 4, at 45. 63 For a discussion on how the IOC's anti-ambush marketing requirements may contravene the right to free speech, see K de Beer, 'Let the Games begin … ambush marketing and freedom of speech' (2012) 6(2) Human Rights and International Legal Discourse 284.
protocols such as the Berne Convention and the Nairobi Treaty. 64 The question will be whether the efficacy and extent of the host's intellectual property regime meets the IOC's requirements or whether it needs to be altered or strengthened in order to secure compliance. As Marcus notes, The IOC's mandate, while clearly defined appears self-contradictory. On one hand, a guarantee must be given that legislation will be passed. The inference here is that some new or additional law must be passed … Yet, this requirement is followed by the instruction to "study existing laws"
and discern "where additional legislation is needed." 65
Here our focus turns to the IOC requirement that host cities create specific Ambush marketing is generally understood to be where an advertiser makes a deliberate and unauthorised association with an event with a view to exploiting the goodwill or wider public interest in it for commercial purposes. 68 This can be broken down further into two discrete sub-categories of ambush marketing, although this typology does not capture the full range of potential ambush activity. 69 First, ambushing the event; this is where the ambusher tries to take advantage of the general goodwill and interest in the event and attempts to draw attention to its own brand. 70 Secondly, ambushing an official sponsor. This is where the ambush is directed specifically at one of the event's official sponsors and partners with a view to undermining and/or parodying its own eventrelated marketing campaign. 71 The IOC and OCOGs have specific concerns about both kinds of ambush marketing strategies. The IOC requires 'clean venues' and 'clean event zones' within which all marketing is either prohibited or very strictly controlled. 72 Further, there is a commercial imperative that requires the IOC to protect the 68 There is a wealth of literature on ambush marketing, its definition and examples of its impact. Useful starting points are J Hoek and P Glendall, 'Ambush Marketing: more than just a commercial irritant?' (2000) 71 For example, the Oddbins campaign that offered a discount to anyone producing proof that they had bought a product or used the services of each of the main Olympic sponsors' rivals: http://www.thedrum.com/news/2012/07/24/pepsi-drinking-nike-wearing-mastercard-usingcustomers-receive-30-oddbins. 72 Rules 40(3) and 50 Olympic Charter (2013), above n 15.
value of its commercial rights and those of each specific edition of the Games in order to raise sufficient funding to be able to host the Olympics to the standard expected by the watching world and the IOC.
Following Atlanta 1996, an event often described as being 'the most hyped and over-commercialized' Games ever, 73 the IOC decided to take action. From Sydney 2000 onwards, the IOC has demanded as a term of the Host City Contract that domestic legislation be enacted that regulates the opportunities for ambush marketing. 74 The Australian legislation is the starting point from which the process of terms that prevented anyone else from using them for their own commercial benefit, infringement of which could lead to an injunction or a claim for damages. 77 Although ambush marketing was less of a problem than at Atlanta, it is difficult to determine the efficacy of the Australian Act as no infringement proceedings were brought under it. 78 As most ambush marketing campaigns are sophisticated enough to avoid direct reference to the event and the protected words, phrases and symbols associated with it, a literal interpretation of the legislation by the police and prosecutors would have ensured that there were few, if any, actionable breaches of these provisions. Despite this outcome, the Australian Act was seen as a breakthrough in the regulation of ambush marketing that was built on at future editions of the Games. so nearly resembles an Olympic … mark as to be likely to be mistaken for it' or any translation thereof. 81 Further, under s 4 of the Canadian Act, directing public attention to a business, wares or services in a manner that was likely to mislead the public into believing that approval, authorisation or endorsement had been secured from VANOC or that a business association existed with VANOC was prohibited. In determining whether or not these provisions had been breached, the court could take into account whether the prohibited words or expressions listed in Sch 2 had been used, 82 or whether the words in part 1 of sch 3 had been used in combination with each other or any of them general words and phrases listed in part 2. 83 This extension of the law from the Australian Act partially closed the loophole identified above by preventing not just the use of specific words and symbols, but also the deliberate confusion of the public by such advertising. Edition'. Despite the displeasure of both VANOC and the IOC, 84 this particular marketing campaign fell outwith the Canadian Act and was, therefore, lawful.
By London 2012, however, a step change in the level of event-specific protection provided to the Olympics can be observed; the creation of the association right.
The London Olympic Association Right (LOAR) conferred exclusive rights on LOCOG in relation to the use of any representation, of any kind, in a manner likely to suggest to the public an association between the London Olympics and any goods or services, or any person providing goods or services. 85 For these purposes, 'association' meant suggesting any kind of contractual or commercial relationship, any kind of corporate or structural connection, and/or the provision of financial or in-kind support for London 2012. 86 The LOAR was infringed by any such unauthorised association made in the course of trade. 87 In determining whether or not an infringement had occurred, the court could take into account whether any of the following words had been used in combination with each other: games, Two Thousand and Twelve, 2012 and twenty twelve; or with any of the following words: gold, silver, bronze, London, medals, sponsor and summer. 88 Infringement of the LOAR provided LOCOG with relief by way of damages, injunctions, accounts or otherwise as is available in respect of the infringement of a property right. 89 Section 30 and Sch 4 of the London Act are acknowledged as being based on the Australian legislation. 90 Further, LOCOG produced its own interpretative guide to the law as part of its programme of education about brand awareness and brand protection. 91 Although this carried no weight in law and the relevant provisions could have been interpreted differently had they been litigated, 92 95 The process continues to be observed through the laws in place at Sochi 2014, which extended the protections afforded to the Games by preventing the use of words or symbols that are similar to those granted legislative protection, and the Brazilian laws for Rio 2016 going further still, prohibiting any improper connection. See further Louw, above n 9, 187 et seq.
CASE STUDY (2) REGULATING SECONDARY TICKET SALES AT THE OLYMPICS
In the case study outlined above, the process was an essentially linear progression across editions of the same event. There is a different aspect that can be identified, however, where legal provisions are adopted and adapted from unrelated contexts, and the 'disconnection' noted by Johnson is even more marked in these instances of 'recycling' municipal laws out of context. We illustrate this here by charting the evolution of regulations concerning ticket touting for the London 2012 edition of the Olympic Games
The unauthorised resale of sporting and entertainment event tickets, or touting, is of considerable concern to both the police, 96 and government. 97 considered necessary. 104 The sole rationale for this provision was the prevention of public disorder; commercial considerations were not part of Taylor LJ's analysis, nor did they form part of the Parliamentary justification for the provision. 105 Ticket touting at designated football matches is an offence where a person sells or otherwise disposes of a ticket for a designated football match, 106 unless they are authorised to do so in writing by the organisers of the match. 107 'Selling' is given an expansive meaning to ensure that the full range of touting activities are caught, including: offering to sell a ticket; exposing a ticket for sale; making a ticket available for sale by another; advertising that a ticket is available for purchase; and giving a ticket to a person who pays or agrees to pay for some other goods or services or offering to do so. 108 For London 2012, it was a requirement of the Host City Contract that all ticketing and admission matters be approved by the IOC at least two years before the commencement of the Games. This included a requirement that anti-touting laws would be in place at least one year before the start of the Games. 109 These guarantees were discharged by the enactment of s 31 LOGPA 2006, which gave effect to LOCOG's Host City Contract commitments by criminalising the unauthorised resale of Games tickets in the same way as s 166 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 110 The definition of selling is the same as in s 166(2)(aa). 111 The main difference in the Olympic offence is that it is committed only where the sale takes place in public (to catch the on-street tout) or in the course of business, 112 which is defined in s 31(2)(c) of the London Act as where the seller makes or aims to make a profit. This ensured that all sales other than those made in private at face value were lawful, but any unauthorised profiteering was criminal.
The legislative provisions thus ensured compliance with requirements that a private body, the IOC, placed on the national government of the Host City. The explanatory notes stated explicitly that s 31 was based upon s 166 CJAPOA 1994. 113 In fact, the section is directly lifted rather than 'based upon' the football offence, leaving a provision that was created to deal with public order issues for a specific sport being used as the template for a provision that is avowedly being used to comply with the commercial requirements of a private body. 114 Indeed, even LOCOG's Brand Protection guidance covers the sale and resale of tickets, 115 reinforcing that these provisions were brought in for a commercial imperative. This example highlights even more explicitly how a transplantation of law from one context can be inappropriately extended and applied to a new and unrelated one. Here, the law created for one purpose (preventing public disorder) and in a highly specific context (English football), is utilised wholesale for an entirely different purpose (protecting the commercial rights of a private undertaking) and for a totally different type of event (the Olympic Games). No discussion of whether this transplantation was necessary, nor whether it was appropriate for the state to police and enforce the contractual provisions of a private commercial body, was undertaken. 116 The impact of this process can be seen when the laws created for an event such away a ticket but charging a booking or other fee constitutes selling. 117 As with the Olympic offence, sales in public and with a view to making a profit are criminal, as is any sale for a price in excess of the ticket's face value. 118 Thus, the Olympic legislation 'cleanses' the inappropriate football-specific public order offence enabling it to be transplanted to a subsequent multi-sport festival in a different legal jurisdiction. In neither case, whether 'upwards' from football to the Olympics or 'downwards' from the Olympics to the Commonwealth Games, is a justification provided for why touting should be criminalised in this way, or indeed at all at these events.
CONCLUSION
What has been identified above, and illustrated via the two cases studies, is that At the same time, it could be asked whether it actually matters where this material comes from. A further way to examine this transplant might be via functionality; rather than examining the process in terms of similarity, the usefulness or functionality of the proposal is a better lens through which to conduct the analysis:
As long as the transplant can serve the social need to be addressed, the transplant can work well in new legal ground. In fact it is this transfer of the transplant to national contexts that promotes indigenization of positive transplants as a block to indiscrete globalization and modern legal colonialism. 125 Whilst we agree with Xanthani's point that a transplant might work well in a new host, this does not affect the underlying problem that irrespective of its utility, whether any social need is served or whether such laws are necessary or appropriate in the first place still needs to be justified objectively rather than self-referentially, and should be the focus for future studies. In addition, the very fact that the process is driven by a private body leveraging its own terms on hosts is a great cause for concern and increases the possibility that such events are only held in pliant jurisdictions prepared to promulgate Olympic Law and accept such transplants without critical reflection.
